Cross-jurisdictional income shifting and tax enforcement: evidence from public versus private multinationals
Marc Deloof and
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Marc Deloof: Accounting and Finance - UA - University of Antwerp
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This paper examines the impact of tax enforcement and public listing status on income shifting by multinational corporations (MNCs). For a sample of over 8,000 subsidiaries that are majority-owned by 959 European MNCs over the period 1998–2009, we find strong evidence of income shifting from high to low tax countries and that income is shifted more out of high-tax countries when local tax enforcement is weak. In addition, we show that private MNCs exploit weak tax enforcement more to shift income out of the parent country compared to public MNCs. Combined, our results suggest that tax enforcement plays a crucial role in MNC income shifting decisions and that shifting is more aggressive when MNCs are less affected by nontax shifting costs as is the case in private MNCs.
Keywords: Tax planning; Income shifting; Tax enforcement; Composite tax score (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in Review of Accounting Studies, Springer Verlag, 2014, 20 (2), pp.710--746. ⟨10.1007/s11142-014-9310-y⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01563059
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