A model of ideological transmission with endogenous parental preferences

Paolo Melindi-Ghidi

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Abstract: Under what conditions can a given trait, such as religion or language, be preserved in the long run? To answer this question I develop a dynamic framework of ideological transmission in families in which parents are biased towards children's traits and socioeconomic activities are modeled in the shape of a trust-matching process. I model how children are educated to a specific ideological trait that later in life will influence the well-being of the family. Compared to the existing literature, my model yields two new results. First, paternalistic preferences in children's education at time t are a necessary but not a sufficient condition to ensure the preservation of heterogeneity in the long-run distribution of traits. Second, my model is able to reproduce historical events in which a reversal of parents' evaluation of traits has been observed. Assuming myopic agents does not change the qualitative results of the model.

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Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory, 2012, 8, pp.381-403

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01614011

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