From “issue-selling” to “issue-buying”: what generates strategists’ attention to risks

Julie Mayer ()
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Julie Mayer: DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The concept of "issue-selling" captures how internal and external actors influence top or middle managers' attention toward specific issues. According to the literature, issue-selling succeeds when top or middle managers perceive the salience of the issue. In this paper, we argue that their attention also depends on how they perceive the issue-selling practices addressed to them. While issue-selling studies have mainly focused on why and how issue-selling is performed, this article focuses on how issue-selling is perceived. We studied how top and middle managers perceived issue-selling actions performed by their risk manager through 38 interviews in 11 companies. We show that issue-selling can lead to issue-buying through three kinds of triggers. Results also challenge the common assumption that issue-selling moves generate attention, by showing how issue-selling's side effects lead to inattention to risks.

Keywords: Vente; Selling; Issue-selling; Managers; Management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-09
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Published in SMS 36th annual conference, Sep 2016, Berlin, Germany

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01620193

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