The economic and legal sides of additionality in Payments for Environmental Services

Alain Karsenty, Sigrid Aubert, Laura Brimont, Céline Dutilly, Sébastien Desbureaux, Driss Ezzine de Blas and Gwenolé Le Velly
Additional contact information
Alain Karsenty: UPR GREEN - Gestion des ressources renouvelables et environnement - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement
Sigrid Aubert: UPR GREEN - Gestion des ressources renouvelables et environnement - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement
Laura Brimont: IDDRI - Institut de Développement Durable et des Relations Internationales
Céline Dutilly: UMR MOISA - Marchés, Organisations, Institutions et Stratégies d'Acteurs - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - CIHEAM-IAMM - Centre International de Hautes Etudes Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - Institut Agronomique Méditerranéen de Montpellier - CIHEAM - Centre International de Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier, Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement
Driss Ezzine de Blas: UPR Forêts et Sociétés - Forêts et Sociétés - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement

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Abstract: This paper aims to clarify two distinct but complementary questions on economic and legal additionality in the payments for environmental services (PES) debate based on examples from the literature and direct observations made in Madagascar and Mexico. For the economic dimension of additionality, we explain two ‘regimes of justification', efficiency on the one hand and social equity on the other, and discuss how analysts position themselves with regard to both regimes. For the legal dimension, we review and analyse specific cases in which PES are implemented in addition to existing environmental regulations. We propose a renewed framework of analysis to distinguish ‘compensation' and ‘reward' in PES by crossing the opportunity cost dimension and the legal constraint vis-à-vis the environment. We show how difficult it is to fully maintain the objective of efficiency when PES are implemented simultaneously across different combinations of opportunity costs and regulation constraints. We propose policy options to address the contradiction between incentive and coercive instruments. These options are land sparing, social targeting and chronological combinations.

Keywords: additionality; crowding out; efficiency; incentives; law compliance; opportunity cost; PES; incentive; equity; paiement pour service environnemental; politique régionale communautaire; législation européenne; additionnalité; incitation; efficience; équité (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published in Environmental Policy and Governance, 2017, 27 (5), pp.422-435. ⟨10.1002/eet.1770⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01627257

DOI: 10.1002/eet.1770

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