Taxation of a digital monopoly platform

Un modèle calibré de l’effet du CICE sur l’emploi

Marc Bourreau, Bernard Caillaud () and Romain de Nijs
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Bernard Caillaud: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Romain de Nijs: X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris

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Abstract: This paper investigates the impact on fiscal revenues of taxing a two-sided monopolistic platform offering personalized services to users and targeted advertising to sellers, based on the collection of users' personal data. We show that the introduction of a small tax on data collection, which has been proposed in the French context by Collin and Colin, fails to increase fiscal revenues if the value-added tax (VAT) rate is high enough, due to a tax base interdependence effect between the two taxes. Under a supermodularity condition on the platform's profit function as a function of its prices, this result generalizes to any per-unit tax. However, in some cases, an ad valorem tax on subscriptions or on advertising may raise fiscal revenues, irrespective of the VAT rate, as well as welfare.

Date: 2018-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2018, 20 (1), ⟨10.1111/jpet.12255⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Taxation of a digital monopoly platform (2018)
Working Paper: Taxation of a digital monopoly platform (2018)
Working Paper: Taxation of a Digital Monopoly Platform (2016)
Working Paper: Taxation of a Digital Monopoly Platform (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01629659

DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12255

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