Targets of Violence: Evidence from India's Naxalite Conflict
Oliver Vanden Eynde
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How does a rebel group's access to funding affect its fighting capacity? Using a district-year panel of fatal Maoist incidents in India between 2005 and 2011, I find that deficient rainfall spurs targeted Maoist violence against civilians but that the number of Maoist attacks against security forces increases only in mining districts. The relationship between income shocks and conflict depends on the type of targets and the revenue sources of the rebels. In particular, the fighting capacity of a rebel group appears to benefit more from negative income shocks if the group's tax base is sufficiently independent from the agricultural economy.
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Published in Economic Journal, Wiley, 2018, 〈10.1111/ecoj.12438〉
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Journal Article: Targets of Violence: Evidence from India's Naxalite Conflict (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01631092
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