Stable Rules for Electing Committees and Divergence on Outcomes

Eric Kamwa

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: For three-candidate elections, this paper focuses on the relationships that exist between three stable rules for committee elections and the classical rules from which each of these stable rules are adapted. When selecting committees, a voting rule is said to be stable if it always elects a xed-size subset of candidates such that there is no candidate in this set that is majority dominated by a candidate outside (Barberà and Coelho, 2008; Coelho, 2004). There are some cases where a committee selected by a stable rule may dier from the committee made by the best candidates of the corresponding classical rule from which this stable rule is adapted. We call this the divergence on outcomes. We characterize all the voting situations under which this event is likely to occur. We also evaluate the likelihood of this event using the impartial anonymous culture assumption. As a consequence of our analysis, we highlight a strong connection between three Condorcet consistent rules: the Dodgson rule, the Maximin rule and the Young rule.

Keywords: Committee; Condorcet; Stable rule; Maximin; Dodgson; Young; Divergence on outcomes; Probability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-05
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.univ-antilles.fr/hal-01631174
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Group Decision and Negotiation, 2017, 26 (3), pp.547 - 564. ⟨10.1007/s10726-016-9504-8⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.univ-antilles.fr/hal-01631174/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Stable Rules for Electing Committees and Divergence on Outcomes (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01631174

DOI: 10.1007/s10726-016-9504-8

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().