Simple centrifugal incentives in spatial competition

Dimitrios Xefteris, Didier Laussel () and Michel Le Breton
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Michel Le Breton: IUF - Institut universitaire de France - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Education nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche, TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper studies the effects of introducing centrifugal incentives in an otherwise standard Downsian model of electoral competition. First, we demonstrate that a symmetric equilibrium is guaranteed to exist when centrifugal incentives are induced by any kind of partial voter participation (such as abstention due to indifference, abstention due to alienation, etc.) and, then, we argue that: (a) this symmetric equilibrium is in pure strategies, and it is hence convergent, only when centrifugal incentives are sufficiently weak on both sides; (b) when centrifugal incentives are strong on both sides (when, for example, a lot of voters abstain when they are sufficiently indifferent between the two candidates) players use mixed strategies—the stronger the centrifugal incentives, the larger the probability weight that players assign to locations near the extremes; and (c) when centrifugal incentives are strong on one side only—say for example only on the right—the support of players' mixed strategies contain all policies except from those that are sufficiently close to the left extreme.

Date: 2017-05
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Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2017, 46 (2), pp.357-381. ⟨10.1007/s00182-016-0540-z⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Simple centrifugal incentives in spatial competition (2017)
Working Paper: Simple Centrifugal Incentives in Spatial Competition (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01634245

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0540-z

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