 Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures: Application to a Supply Chain GameZied Jemai (),
A Elomri,
A Ghaffari and
Y. Dallery
Post-Print from HAL Abstract: The goal of this chapter is to provide a study of the coalition formation problem in supply chains using Hedonic cooperative games. The goal is to focus on the problems of (i) coalition structure generation, i.e., formation of coalition structures, such that agents inside a coalition coordinate their activities, but agents of different coalitions will work independently; and (ii) worth sharing, i.e., distribution of the worth generated by the coalition to its agents. We namely demonstrate that when cost-based proportional rule and equal allocation rule are used to divide the total created value, the efficient coalitions always exist and satisfy a set of desirable properties. Further; with the general results, we go deeper into a non-superadditive joint replenishment game with full truckload shipments for which we provide a polynomial algorithmic solution to generate the coalitions Keywords: Coalition stability; Cooperative game theory; Hedonic games (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Applications of multi-criteria and game theory approaches - Springer Series in Advanced Manufacturing, 2014, ⟨10.1007/978-1-4471-5295-8_15⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01672402 DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4471-5295-8_15 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.