Contracting under uncertain capacity

Zied Jemai (), Nesim Erkip and Yves Dallery ()
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Zied Jemai: LGI - Laboratoire Génie Industriel - EA 2606 - CentraleSupélec
Yves Dallery: LGI - Laboratoire Génie Industriel - EA 2606 - CentraleSupélec

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Abstract: In this paper, we develop a two-stage supply-chain in which a supplier with uncertain capacity sells to a retailer facing a Newsvendor problem. We analyze the centralized system where both partners take their decisions to optimize the expected system profit and the decentralized system where they make decisions individually. We show that, in a framework of Stackelberg equilibrium, the decentralized model is less efficient than the centralized model and we propose a buy-back contract that coordinates the system.

Keywords: Game theory; Supply chain coordination under uncertain capacity; Modeling methodologies; Supply chain optimization; performance analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-05-27
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in International Conference on Information Systems, Logistics and Supply Chain (ILS), May 2006, Lyon, France

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01672452

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