Démocratie et justice sociale: Arrow-Harsanyi- Rawls-Sen, un quatuor dissonant

Philippe Adair

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Abstract: Is social justice congruent with democracy? Are utilitarianism and welfare economics compatible with political liberalism? Salient disagreements between welfare economics and political philosophy focus upon the choice of principles of justice in a democratic society, and sustainability thereof remains an open question. Arrow's theorem establishes the impossibility of grounding a social welfare function upon individual preferences. Harsanyi's rule-utilitarianism builds a welfare function upon Bayesian expected utility. Rawls's contractarian theory of justice upholds the priority of the right over the good. Sen's theory of social choice rejects the compatibility of the Pareto principle with political liberalism.

Keywords: democracy; justice; political liberalism; social choice; utilitarianism; welfare; Bien-être; choix social; démocratie; libéralisme politique; préférences; utilitarisme; JEL Classification: D63; D71; I32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Published in Éthique et économique/Ethics and economics, 2016

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