Approval Voting, Evaluation Voting

Vote par approbation, vote par note

Antoinette Baujard, Frédéric Gavrel, Herrade Igersheim, Jean-François Laslier and Isabelle Lebon

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Abstract: During the first round of the French 2012 presidential elections on April 22, voters in three French municipalities were invited to participate in an experiment that tested two plurinominal voting systems. These were approval voting (AV) and three types of evaluation voting (EV). This paper presents the key results of that experiment. After correcting for participation and representation biases, two major insights emerge. First, the AV method results in a ranking of candidates that is different from that of the official, uninominal voting system; and, second, regardless of the scale of scores, the EV method reinforces this difference.

Keywords: Quasi-­‐field experiment; Approval voting; Evaluation voting; Experimental economics; Economie expérimentale; Expérimentation quasi-­terrain; Vote par approbation; Vote par évaluation; Elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Revue Economique, 2013, 64 (2), pp.345-356. ⟨10.3917/reco.642.0006⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01755635

DOI: 10.3917/reco.642.0006

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