Frivolous Suits

Yannick Gabuthy () and Eve-Angeline Lambert
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Yannick Gabuthy: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Frivolous lawsuits refer to cases that are brought by plaintiffs with the only objective to extract settlement offers from defendants. Whereas a wide literature questions the credibility of frivolous litigation, this phenomenon had significant policy implications by inspiring several legal reform acts designed to deter meritless claims. Indeed, the issue of frivolous suits may be important from a welfare perspective since such claims may consume substantial resources (due to litigation costs, judicial congestion, etc.) and have negative distributive consequences (since a payment is made to a party who has no legal entitlement to recovery).

Keywords: Litigation; Frivolous suits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Published in Alain Marciano; Giovanni Battista Ramello. Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Springer Verlag, 2017, 978-1-4614-7752-5. ⟨10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_732⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01760513

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_732

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