The Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser

Eric Kamwa

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Under Approval Voting (AV), each voter just distinguishes the candidates he approves of from those appearing as unacceptable. The Preference Approval Voting (PAV) is a hybrid version of the approval voting first introduced by Brams and Sanver (2009). Under PAV, each voter ranks all the candidates and then indicates the ones he approves. In this paper, we provide analytical representations for the probability that PAV elects the Condorcet winner when she exists in three-candidate elections with large electorates. We also provide analytical representations for the probability that PAV elects the Condorcet loser. We perform our analysis by assuming the assumption of the Extended Impartial Culture. This analysis allows us to measure at which extend, PAV performs better than AV both on the propensity of electing the Condorcet loser and on that of the non-election of the Condorcet loser.

Keywords: Probability; Condorcet; Extended Impartial Culture; Ranking; Approval Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pol
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.univ-antilles.fr/hal-01786121v2
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Theory and Decision, 2019, 87 (3), pp.299-320

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.univ-antilles.fr/hal-01786121v2/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01786121

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().