Democracy and competition: Vertical differentiation and labor in a general equilibrium model

Amani Kahloul, Rim Lahmandi-Ayed, Hejer Lasram and Didier Laussel ()
Additional contact information
Amani Kahloul: Université de Sousse

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We consider a general equilibrium model with vertical preferences and one or two firms, where workers and consumers are differentiated, respectively, by their sensitivity to effort and their preference for quality. The question in this paper is whether a decentralized choice through majority vote would lead to more or less competition. We compare the duopoly and the monopoly cases from the viewpoint of each individual, then we deduce the choice of the majority. We prove that, under concentrated ownership (where owners have a null density), duopoly is always preferred by the majority; while under egalitarian ownership (where firms are equally shared by all the population), the choice of the majority depends on the relative size of workers' and consumers' segments.

Date: 2017-08
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://amu.hal.science/hal-01793055
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2017, 19 (4), pp.860 - 874. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12256⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://amu.hal.science/hal-01793055/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Democracy and competition: Vertical differentiation and labor in a general equilibrium model (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01793055

DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12256

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().