Selling Strategic Information in Digital Competitive Markets

David Bounie (), Antoine Dubus () and Patrick Waelbroeck
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David Bounie: Télécom ParisTech
Antoine Dubus: Télécom ParisTech

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Abstract: This article investigates the strategies of a data broker selling information to one or to two competing firms. The data broker combines segments of the consumer demand that allow firms to third-degree price discriminate consumers. We show that the data broker (1) sells information on consumers with the highest willingness to pay; (2) keeps consumers with low willingness to pay unidentified. The data broker strategically chooses to withhold information on consumer demand to soften competition between firms. These results hold under first degree price discrimination, which is a limit case when information is perfect.

Keywords: Data broker; Information Structure; Price-discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-pay
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01794886v3
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in The RAND Journal of Economics, inPress

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Related works:
Journal Article: Selling strategic information in digital competitive markets (2021)
Working Paper: Selling Strategic Information in Digital Competitive Markets (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01794886

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