Equity justifications for universal service obligations
Jean-Christophe Poudou and
Michel Roland ()
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Michel Roland: CREATE, Centre de Recherche en économie de l'Environnement, de l'Agroalimentaire, des Transports et de l'Énergie - ULaval - Université Laval [Québec], ULaval - Université Laval [Québec]
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Abstract:
Equity is often invoked as a possible justification for the imposition of universal service obligations (USOs). However, no previous analysis supports a formal link between equity and USO. In this paper, we describe the extent to which the im- position of USOs in oligopolistic network industries can meet the objectives of an inequality-averse regulator. We show that USOs can be used for equity purposes provided that the regulator is able to control the competitive structure of the industry. We also show that the uniform pricing constraint, which is an obligation to offer the same price conditions to all consumers, is welfare-enhancing but rather surprisingly, it does not necessarily improve equity.
Keywords: Universal service obligations; Price constraint; equity; coverage and price constraints; regulation; Coverage constraint (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-05
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.umontpellier.fr/hal-01810301
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2017, 52, pp.63 - 95. ⟨10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.01.007⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01810301
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.01.007
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