Concession minière et asymétrie d'information

Jean-Christophe Poudou and Lionel Thomas ()
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Lionel Thomas: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]

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Abstract: Mining Concessions and Asymmetric Information by Jean-Christophe Poudou and Lionel Thomas . We study a concession contract for exploiting an exhaustible resource when a mining firm has private information about its costs. We show that the "traditional" balance between revenue and efficiency, which results in a lower level of production than with symmetric information, is not systematic in this contract. This is due to the specific depletion cost of non-renewable resources.

Date: 2000
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Published in Economie et Prévision, 2000, 143/144, pp.129-138. ⟨10.3406/ecop.2000.6096⟩

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Journal Article: Concession minière et asymétrie d'information (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01811073

DOI: 10.3406/ecop.2000.6096

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