Matching in the large: An experimental study

Yan Chen, Min Jiang, Onur Kesten, Stéphane Robin () and Min Zhu
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Min Jiang: Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Onur Kesten: Carnegie Mellon Tepper School of Business - CMU - Carnegie Mellon University [Pittsburgh]
Stéphane Robin: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Min Zhu: BNU - Beijing Normal University

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Abstract: We compare the performance of the Boston Immediate Acceptance (IA) and Gale–Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanisms in a laboratory setting where we increase the number of participants per match. In our experiment, we first increase the number of students per match from 4 to 40; when we do so, participant truth-telling increases under DA but decreases under IA, leading to a decrease in efficiency under both mechanisms. Furthermore, we find that DA remains more stable than IA, regardless of scale. We then further increase the number of participants per match to 4,000 through the introduction of robots. When robots report their preferences truthfully, we find that scale has no effect on human best response behavior. By contrast, when we program the robots to draw their strategies from the distribution of empirical human strategies, we find that our increase in scale increases human ex-post best responses under both mechanisms.

Keywords: Matching; School choice; Experiment; Scale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01823548v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, 110, pp.295 - 317. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.004⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Matching in the large: An experimental study (2018)
Working Paper: Matching in the Large: An Experimental Study (2017)
Working Paper: Matching in the Large: An Experimental Study (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01823548

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.004

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