The role of independent directors in the performance of overconfident acquirers: Effects of board tenure and multiple directorships

Rôle des administrateurs indépendants sur la performance des acquéreurs surconfiants: effets de la durée de présence au conseil et des mandats cumulés

Naoufel Krifa and Jérôme Maati ()
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Naoufel Krifa: Université de Lille
Jérôme Maati: Université de Lille

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Date: 2018
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Published in Recherches en sciences de gestion, 2018, 126 (3), ⟨10.3917/resg.126.0131⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01862905

DOI: 10.3917/resg.126.0131

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