Rémunérations des PDG: toniques ou toxiques ? Une mise en perspective de la littérature

Frédéric Teulon, Guillaume Bigot (), Bernard Terrany and Negar Youssefian ()
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Guillaume Bigot: IPAG Business School
Bernard Terrany: IPAG Business School
Negar Youssefian: IPAG Business School

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Abstract: This paper addresses two open questions about the CEO pay: 1/ Why has CEO pay increased so much ? 2/ What is behind this evolution ? This paper deals briefly with these issues. The purpose of this study is to review prior literature related to CEO pay and its impact on public policy, firm value and corporate decision making. We highlight the ambiguity of the empirical observations. A discussion of the most recent and relevant literature is provided. The purpose of this study is to think about this major social issue. It is found that the evolution of the CEO pay is ambiguous. In addition, our paper suggests to be careful in the interpretation of the explanatory factors. We finish with a brief discussion of the practical implications of this research.

Keywords: Agency problem; Corporate gouvernance; Executive compensation; Ownership structure; Gouvernement d'entreprise; Rémunérations des PDG; Say-on-Pay; Structure d'actionnariat; Théorie de l'agence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01865108
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Published in Management & sciences sociales, 2016, RSE et éthique-Impacts sur l'enseignement du management, 21 (21), pp.115-128

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