The European Common Good: an Economist's Perspective

Jacques Le Cacheux

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Abstract: Economists tend to ignore the notion of common good, and focus instead on collective or club goods. In the European Union context, the progress made in the market integration and the monetary union has strengthened interdependencies amongst member states, thus reinforcing the need for common institutions, not only to constrain national governments not to do things that may harm partner countries, but also to decide on what the common good is, what actions it requires and how to collectively act for its further development. As shown with the management of the recent crises—the Great Recession of 2009, the sovereign debt crisis starting in 2010, and the more recent migrant crisis—the Lisbon Treaty did not introduce appropriate and efficient collective decision-making procedures, while the European budget is clearly too rigid, too small and insufficiently funded to face the challenges posed by the European common good.

Date: 2015
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Published in L'Europe en formation. Revue d'études sur la construction européenne et le fédéralisme, 2015, 376, pp.108-115. ⟨10.3917/eufor.376.0108⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01884853

DOI: 10.3917/eufor.376.0108

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