Faut-il introduire en France une class action d'actionnaires (Securities Class Actions) ?
Gurvan Branellec () and
Ji-Yong Lee
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Gurvan Branellec: BBS - Brest business school
Ji-Yong Lee: Audencia Business School
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Abstract:
After the introduction of the class action in French consumer law, we can question the relevance of the introduction of securities class action in France. To answer this question, this paper examines the usefulness and the functioning of the Anglo-Saxon model. Securities fraud class actions originating in the United States account for nearly half of all types of class actions. This legal proceeding is a most common manner by which a large group of shareholders seeks to recover damages based upon claims of fraudulent statements, but it can be a source of excessive and abusive litigation. In France, French shareholders who suffer economic injury have difficulties in recovering damages. French law can therefore draw inspiration from the Anglo-Saxonmodel while limiting its excesses. Proposals are made for this purpose.
Keywords: securities class actions; shareholders; corporate governance.; gouvernance d’entreprise.; class actions d’actionnaires; actionnaires (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01894300v1
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Published in Management & sciences sociales, 2018, Risque : débattre et surtout décider, 24 (24), pp.19-34
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01894300
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