INCITANTS FINANCIERS DU DIRIGEANT ET NIVEAU D'ENDETTEMENT OPTIMAL

Alexandre Di Giacomo and Pascal Alphonse ()
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Alexandre Di Giacomo: LSMRC - Lille School of Management Research Center - ULR 4112 - SKEMA Business School - Université de Lille
Pascal Alphonse: LSMRC - Lille School of Management Research Center - ULR 4112 - SKEMA Business School - Université de Lille

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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to highlight the link between incentive mix and financing policy. We focus on the conditional effect of pay to performance sensitivity on risk taking behavior. We focus on target debt leverage level determinants using a dynamic adjustment model. We consider US firms to validate our hypothesis on the period 1992-2005. Our data are extracted from Compustat and Execucomp database. The main result of this work is that the efficiency of risk incentive is highly dependent of CEO's performance incentive reaching a given threshold.

Keywords: CEO; debt; incentive; dette; dirigeant; incitants; stock-options (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05-27
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01899182
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Published in Mesure, évaluation, notation – les comptabilités de la société du calcul, May 2014, Lille, France. pp.cd-rom

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