JUSTE VALEUR, CONTROLE INTERNE ET CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: COMMENT L’INFORMATION FINANCIERE NE PEUT PAS ETRE COMPTABLE ET TRANSPARENTE

Lambert Jerman ()
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Lambert Jerman: HEC Montréal - HEC Montréal

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Abstract: For the dominant principles of « good » governance since the Cadbury report was released in 1992, corporate governance is defined as an agency conflict between shareholders and managers. With fair value, financial information thus embodies a way of solving this conflict through transparency and the discipline of internal control. Using an unusual research design using a participant observation, I show instead how far the rational forms of governance rely on a set of illusions. More specifically, I highlight that because of its basis on management instruments that make technical expertise the unchallenged foundation of performance representation, fair value is a vector for new moral hazard situations.

Keywords: Fair value; governance; ethnography; internal control; Juste valeur; gouvernance; ethnographie; contrôle interne (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05-27
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Published in Mesure, évaluation, notation – les comptabilités de la société du calcul, May 2014, Lille, France. pp.cd-rom

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