Effet de la structure de propriété sur le choix entre la gestion réelle et comptable des résultats. Cas des sociétés françaises cotées

Ines Ahmed (), Wafa Khlif () and Mehdi Nekhili
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Wafa Khlif: ESC Toulouse - Groupe École Supérieure de Commerce de Toulouse - ESCT

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Abstract: Our aim is to study the effect of ultimate ownership structure on earnings management by taking into account the choice to operate real or accounting earnings management. On a sample of 81 firms listed on the SBF 250 index on the period 2001 to 2009, we validate the incentive effect since ultimate cash flow right reduces earnings management. Family control and institutional ownership reduce significantly real earnings management. On the other hand, control contestability and shareholders agreements exacerbate earnings management showing an agency problem among large shareholders. We also find that there is a complementary relationship between accounting and real earnings management.

Keywords: ultimate ownership structure; real earnings management; accounting earnings management; Structure de propriété ultime; gestion réelle des résultats; accruals discrétionnaires (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-05-19
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Published in Comptabilité et gouvernance, May 2016, Clermont, France. pp.cd-rom

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01901119

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