Endogenous timing in contests

Grégoire Rota-Graziosi () and Magnus Hoffmann
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Grégoire Rota-Graziosi: CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - UCA [2017-2020] - Université Clermont Auvergne [2017-2020] - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Grégoire ROTA GRAZIOSI

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Abstract: This second volume of the Handbook includes original contribution by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical as well as new IO topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization and empirical models of R&D.

Date: 2018-02-28
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Published in Edward Elgar Publishing. Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, II, pp.147-174, 2018, Applications, 978 1 78811 277 2

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