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The perils of democracy

Gregory De Angelo, Dimitri Dubois () and Rustam Romaniuc
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Gregory De Angelo: Claremont Graduate University [Claremont, CA ]
Rustam Romaniuc: LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - Université de Lille - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In this work we examine a common social dilemma in experimental economics, the public goods game, to determine how voting impacts pro-social behavior. As noted in Markussen et al. (2014), a democratic dividend exists. Couching the public goods game in a phenomenon that is playing out in much of the world – drastic income inequality – we examine the decision of groups to share local public goods with groups that have, effectively, no endowment to contribute toward public nor private consumption. Our results show the perils of democracy in that subjects in the position to vote use their advantageous situation to reward the ingroups at the expense of the less endowed outgroup members.

Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pol
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Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Elsevier, In press, 175, pp.328-340. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.020⟩

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DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.020

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