Intra-household bargaining in poor countries

Jean-Marie Baland and Roberta Ziparo

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Abstract: This paper is intended to bridge the theoretical literature describing efficient intra-household behaviour and the development literature that collects empirical regularities pointing toward the existence of strategic decision-making among spouses. It examines the key elements of the collective model and discusses its relevance to analysing intra-household behaviour in poor countries. It explores the role that risk and uncertainty, information asymmetries, power imbalances, arranged marriages, strategic investment, gender norms, and extended households play in the attainment of efficiency.

Keywords: household; efficiency; development; strategic behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://amu.hal.science/hal-01980523v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Published in Towards Gender Equity in Development, Oxford University Press, 2018, 978-0-19-882959-1

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Related works:
Working Paper: Intra-household bargaining in poor countries (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01980523

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