The weak-core of a game in normal form with a continuum of players

Youcef Askoura ()
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Youcef Askoura: LEMMA - Laboratoire d'économie mathématique et de microéconomie appliquée - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas

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Abstract: This paper deals with the weak-core of normal form games with a continuum set of players and without side payments. This concept is an approximation of the core introduced by Weber, Shapley and Shubik. The weak-core is slightly larger than Aumann's α−core when adapted to large anonymous games. A non emptiness result is obtained based on the well known Scarf's non vacuity theorem for finite games.

Keywords: α−Core; Game with a Continuum of Players; Normal Form Games; Large Anonymous Games; Weak-Core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01982380v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, 47 (1), pp.43-47. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.11.003⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01982380

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.11.003

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