 An American-Style Transfer Union in Europe, A First Glance at How Much It Might CostCasimir Dadak and
Roman Matkovskyy
Post-Print from HAL Abstract: Since 1992, the European Union has been reallocating resources among its members through, among others, so-called cohesion funds. However, there is a growing perception among economists and politicians that the scope and magnitude of those transfers is inadequate. In this paper we compare the degree of fiscal transfers in the EU to those in the U.S. and estimate the changes needed to make the EU more like the U.S. Data on American inter-state fiscal transfers show that, on average, the most affluent states consistently make significantly larger payments to the federal government than they receive from it and that the opposite is true for the less affluent states. Our research shows that, unlike in the U.S., fiscal transfers in the EU are not closely related to a member state's standard of living. We also find that, compared to the U.S., the least affluent nations in the EU receive disproportionally small net payments from the common budget. An American-style fiscal union would require more affluent EU members to make net contributions many times over their actual net payments. Keywords: economic integration; federalism; fiscal transfers; income redistribution (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Journal of Economic Issues, 2018, 52 (3), pp.749-769 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01989554 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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