General distribution of consumers in pure Hotelling games

Gaëtan Fournier

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Abstract: A pure Hotelling game is a spatial competition between a finite number of players who simultaneously select a location in order to attract as many consumers as possible. In this paper, we study the case of a general distribution of consumers on a network generated by a metric graph. Because players do not compete on price, the continuum of consumers shop at the closest player's location. If the number of sellers is large enough, we prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, and we construct it.

Keywords: Hotelling games; Location games on networks; Pure equilibria; Approximate Nash equilibria; Large games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2019, 48 (1), pp.33-59. ⟨10.1007/s00182-018-0648-4⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01994400

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-0648-4

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