Employment, hours and the welfare effects of intra-firm bargaining

Maarten Dossche, Vivien Lewis and Céline Poilly ()

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Abstract: Bilateral bargaining between a multiple-worker firm and individual employees leads to overhiring. With a concave production function, the firm can reduce the marginal product by hiring an additional worker, thereby reducing the bargaining wage paid to all existing employees. We show that this externality is amplified when firms can adjust hours per worker as well as employment. Firms keep down workers' wage demands by reducing the number of hours per worker and the resulting labor disutility. Our finding is particularly relevant for European economies where hours adjustment plays an important role.

Keywords: Overhiring; Employment; Hours; Intrafirm bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://amu.hal.science/hal-01995026
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published in Journal of Monetary Economics, 2019, 104, pp.67-84. ⟨10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.09.002⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Employment, hours and the welfare effects of intra-firm bargaining (2019)
Working Paper: Employment, Hours and the Welfare Effects of Intra-Firm Bargaining (2016)
Working Paper: Employment, Hours and the Welfare Effects of Intra-Firm Bargaining (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01995026

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.09.002

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