Délégation et RSE dans un duopole différencié

Kadohognon Ouattara

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Abstract: This paper examines the strategic use of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in an oligopolistic industry composed of two firms producing differentiated goods. The owners of each firm have the option to hire a manager and offer them incentive contracts including CSR criteria. It is shown that, in equilibrium, both firms hire a socially responsible manager. Furthermore, the use of this type of incentive contract contributes to imrove consumer surplus and social welfare.

Keywords: Managerial incentives; CSR; Imperfect competition; Product differentiation; Incitations managériales; RSE; concurrence imparfaite; différenciation des produits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-08-22
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Published in Entreprise & société, 2018, Entreprise & Société 2018 – 1, n° 3. varia, 1 (3), pp.119-136. ⟨10.15122/isbn.978-2-406-08427-3.p.0119⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02058137

DOI: 10.15122/isbn.978-2-406-08427-3.p.0119

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