Le changement institutionnel peut-il être analysé comme évolutionnaire ? quelques limites de l'approche économique standard et quelques voies ouvertes à l'approche évolutionnaire

Maurice Baslé

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Abstract: The interrogation of the paper is a simple one : the process of regulation change has mainly been analyzed by theoreticians of law not by pure economists. Nevertheless, some american economists have proposed economic analysis of law : in this case, the analysis appeared to be too complex to be modelized. Here, we draw up an inventory of the contributions of those different schools in economics : the public-interest approach in public economics, the politico-economical approach of group of interest and the capture of the regulator (Chicago's school) ; a generalization of the later approach wellknown as the « rent-seeking » approach. Questions are : what about the potentalities of these economic approaches? And is there still some place for a specific institutionnalist approach? Could we find an interest in a more evolutionnist economic approach of regulation change, as specialists of genesis of laws do?

Keywords: analyse économique des réglementations.; changement institutionnel; evolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Published in Économie appliquée : archives de l'Institut de science économique appliquée, 1997

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02081216

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