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Does trust matter for R&D cooperation? A game theoretic examination

Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin () and Shyama Ramani
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Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin: CREAM - Centre de Recherche en Economie Appliquée à la Mondialisation - UNIROUEN - Université de Rouen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - IRIHS - Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire Homme et Société - UNIROUEN - Université de Rouen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université
Shyama Ramani: X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris

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Abstract: The game theoretical approach to R&D cooperation does not investigate the role of trust in the initiation and success of R&D cooperation: it either assumes that firms are non-opportunists or that the R&D cooperation is supported by an incentive mechanism that eliminates opportunism. In contrast, the present paper focuses on these issues by introducing incomplete information and two types of firms: opportunist and non-opportunist. Defining trust as the belief of each firm that its potential collaborator will respect the contract, it identifies the trust conditions under which firms initiate R&D alliances and contribute to their success. The higher the spillovers, the higher the level of trust required to initiate R&D cooperation for non-opportunists, while the inverse holds for opportunists.

Keywords: TRUST AND OPPORTUNISM; NON COOPERATIVE GAME; R&D COOPERATION; RECHERCHE-DEVELOPPEMENT; INDUSTRIE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published in Theory and Decision, 2004, 57 (2), pp.143-180. ⟨10.1007/s11238-004-3673-7⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02088766

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-004-3673-7

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