Nonexclusive competition and adverse selection

Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
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Thomas Mariotti: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We provide in this article a survey of recent work on competition under adverse selection and nonexclusivity, that is, when an informed buyer can simultaneously trade with several sellers. We discuss the equilibrium outcomes of different trading games, depending on whether sellers can only post linear prices, limit-orders, or convex or arbitrary tariffs. We emphasize that the existence of an equilibrium is problematic and characterize the unique entry-proof tariff.

Keywords: competition; nonexclusivity; adverse selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Published in Revue Economique, 2018, 69 (6), pp.1009-1023

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02100442

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