The stickiness of norms

Katherine Farrow () and Rustam Romaniuc ()
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Katherine Farrow: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In this paper we study the role of social context, as characterized by different informal norm-enforcement mechanisms, on the deterrence legacy of temporary external regulations. In a public goods game, we create conditions in which a prosocial norm of cooperation is enforced via either anonymous peer punishment or face-saving concerns. In two test treatments, we introduce to these social environments an external regulation that is implemented for a limited period of time and then removed. We observe a significant negative post-intervention effect of this removal in the context of peer disapproval, but no such effect in the context of face-saving concerns. Our findings reveal the importance of the type of norm-enforcement mechanism in determining the robustness of norm adherence in the long term.

Keywords: Social norms; Peer punishment; Saving face; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02110601
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Published in International Review of Law and Economics, 2019, 58, pp.54-62. ⟨10.1016/j.irle.2018.12.010⟩

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Journal Article: The stickiness of norms (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02110601

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2018.12.010

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