Necessary players, Myerson fairness and the equal treatment of equals

Florian Navarro

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Abstract: This article addresses linear sharing rules on transferable utility games (TU-games) with various structures, namely communication structures and conference structures as defined by Myerson in two papers (Myerson in Mathematics of Operations Research 2:225–229, 1977; Myerson in International Journal of Game Theory 9:169–182, 1980). Here, using matrix expressions, we rewrite those sharing rules. With this presentation we identify the close relationship between the fairness property and an equal treatment of necessary players axiom. Moreover, we show that the latter is implied by the equal treatment of equals, linking the fairness property to the notion of equality.

Keywords: Game theory; Myerson value; Fairness; Graph; Cooperative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02118370v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Annals of Operations Research, 2019, 280, pp.111-119. ⟨10.1007/s10479-018-3055-0⟩

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Journal Article: Necessary players, Myerson fairness and the equal treatment of equals (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02118370

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-018-3055-0

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