Formal and Informal Interactions in a Duopoly Model

Saïd Souam () and Kahina Cherfi-Feroukhi

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This article theoretically analyzes the interactions between formal and informal firms in a vertically differentiated duopoly in which a regulatory authority intervenes to control the compliance of the firms to the law. In our simple framework, it turns out that it is never optimal to deter completely the informal firm from entering the market. This is mainly due to a production expansion effect and to an increased price competition, which increase the consumers' surplus. Moreover, it appears that a complete 'laissez-faire' policy is never optimal.

Keywords: [No; keyword; available] (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Economics Bulletin, 2019, 39, pp.1095-1102

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Formal and Informal Interactions in a Duopoly Model (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02133986

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().