Les déterminants de l'activisme des actionnaires minoritaires: insuffisance de gouvernance affichée ou de résultats financiers?

Quoc Thai Huynh (quoc.thai.huynh@univ-poitiers.fr)
Additional contact information
Quoc Thai Huynh: CEREGE [Poitiers, La Rochelle] - Centre de recherche en gestion [EA 1722] - UP - Université de Poitiers = University of Poitiers - ULR - La Rochelle Université

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Since the NRE Act of 2001, the legislature has expressed its commitment to respect the rules of governance formalized in the Viénot report in 1995. Their pro-motion was linked by defense agencies of the shareholders. Their adoption is based on the principle of "comply or explain". Despite the positive signal they could send to the market, firms prefer to keep bylaws theoretically contrary to the interests of their shareholders. This research study relationships between risk activism, corporate governance and financial perfor-mance. What is the profile of companies targeted by the minor-ity shareholder activism?

Keywords: corporate governance; shareholder activism; activisme; gouvernance; droits des actionnaires (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-06-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2010, 13 (3), pp.95-114

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02145215

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD (hal@ccsd.cnrs.fr).