 Shareholder activism from the point of view of Calabresi and Melamed's principles: a trade-off between property rules and responsability rulesL'activisme actionnarial sous l'angle des principes de Calabresi et Melamed: un arbitrage entre règles de propriété et règles de responsabilitéQuoc Thai Huynh ()
Post-Print from HAL Abstract: This article aims to analyze shareholder activism under a legal-economic perspective. Parallel to the agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) has developed a theory of legal economic outcome from the seminal article of Calabresi and Melamed (1972), which provided an analytical framework for understanding the variety of way in which transferable rights are protected. Regarding the rights of minority shareholders, legal theory is faced with a trade-off in its treatment of ex-ante and ex-post activism by property rules and liability rules. Keywords: shareholder activism; corporate governance; property rules; responsability rules; Activismo de los accionistas; buen gobierno; voto estratégico; retención de votos; normas de propiedad; normas de responsabilidad.; Activisme actionnarial; gouvernance; votes stratégiques; rétentions des votes; règles de propriété; règles de responsabilité (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Revue Sciences de Gestion, 2010, 77, pp.77-91 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02145233 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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