Threat, sanction or advice? Prosocials vs. individualists: Which incentive for whom?

Menacer, sanctionner ou conseiller ? Pro-sociaux vs individualistes: quels leviers incitatifs pour quels individus ?

Agnès Festré, Ankinée Kirakozian and Mira Toumi ()
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Mira Toumi: GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur

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Abstract: In this article we investigate and compare the effect of a collective sanction (namely, an increase of the tax burden) with a recommendation, both from a third-party, in a public good game "à la Andreoni [1993]" where crowding-out is possible. Furthermore, we test for the correlation between the incentives and the social orientation of subjects on cooperation by using a social value orientation (SVO) test. Our results show that, in general, the sanction is more powerful than the recommendation but also that the threat of punishment has a disciplinary impact by enhancing cooperation. Moreover, we show that both sanction and its threat have a different impact according to the social orientation of subjects: contrary to individua-lists and competitors, prosocials are not significantly sensitive to both.

Keywords: Public goods; Voluntary contributions; Incentives; Social preferences; Experiment; bien collectif; contribution volontaire; incitations; préférences sociales; expérience (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Published in Revue Economique, A paraître, 70 (9), pp.1125-1138

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02182072

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