Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson et la théorie des mécanismes

Francoise Forges

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Abstract: Most economic decisions involve agents who do not share the same information. Suppose a planner wishes to collect the agents' information and act for them. Is there a synthetic description of the set of all procedures available to the planner? Which are the criteria to be fulfilled by an optimal procedure? Is it possible to design a procedure which necessarily achieves a given outcome? These are topics in mechanism theory. Three prominent representatives of this theory, Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson, have received in 2007 the Sveriges Riksbank prize in economic sciences in memory of Alfred Nobel.

Keywords: Hurwicz; Maskin; Myerson; Mécanisme incitatif; concrétisation; incentive compatible mechanism; implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2007, 6 (117), pp.873-890. ⟨10.3917/redp.176.0873⟩

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Journal Article: Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson et la Théorie des Mécanismes (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02276813

DOI: 10.3917/redp.176.0873

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