Consumption externality and Pigovian taxation: A comparison between Rawls and Bentham

Herrade Igersheim and Thi Kim Cuong Pham ()

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This chapter provides two well-known welfare criteria – the Rawlsian maximin and the Benthamian utilitarianism – to a simple model with consumption externality. It reminds the normative implications of Rawlsian maximin and Benthamian utilitarianism. The chapter proposes a simple model with consumption externality and a numerical example. It shows that the normative difference occurs for the special case of Pigovian taxes with consumption externality. The competitive equilibrium of this economy is not efficient, because of the negative externality engendered by the individual quest for status. The chapter also provides the Rawlsian maximin conception of justice and the Benthamian utilitarianism to a model with consumption externality. Indeed, as utilitarianism, Rawls's theory can be defined by two levels: the individual one which proposes a non-welfarist evaluation of individual well-being (evaluation in terms of primary goods) and the collective one which aims to consider individuals as ends and not as means.

Keywords: Economics; Philosophy; Histoire de l'économie politique; Philosophie économique; Individualité (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Ragip Ege; Herrade Igersheim. The Individual and the Other in Economic Thought, 1, Routledge, Taylor & Francis group, pp.381, 2018, 978-1-138-08070-6

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02309628

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().