From private to public common agency

Etienne Billette de Villemeur and Bruno Versaevel

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Abstract: This note establishes that two propositions in the theory of private common agency by Laussel and Le Breton (J. Econ. Theory 100 (2001) 93) extend to a larger class of games, in which each principal's gross monetary payoff does not depend exclusively on the quantities she receives. A new result is offered to demonstrate that Proposition 4.3 is robust to the introduction of negative externalities. An existing result is reinterpreted to show that Proposition 4.2 is robust to the introduction of positive externalities.

Date: 2003-08-01
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Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2003, 111 (2), 305-309 p. ⟨10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00077-2⟩

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Journal Article: From private to public common agency (2003)
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Working Paper: From Private to Public Common Agency (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02311683

DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00077-2

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