Altruism, Agency and the Competitiveness of Family Firms

Michael Lubatkin, William S. Schulze and Richard N. Dino
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Michael Lubatkin: EM - EMLyon Business School

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Abstract: The core belief among agency theorists is that when a firm is both owned and managed by family members, its governance structure is efficient. We argue that this belief over-simplifies the complexity of exchanges that occur among the family firm's decision agents, and does not conform to reality. We develop an alternative agency view of family firm governance that accounts for agency problems that are understated in extant agency models. These problems are rooted in the firm's ownership structure, as well as the altruistic relationships that exist between the firm's decision agents. We conclude with four propositions that address the competitive implications of this alternative view.

Date: 2002-06-01
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Published in Managerial and Decision Economics, 2002, 23 (4-5), pp.247-259 P

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02311705

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