La gouvernance des pôles de compétitivité: Impasses théoriques et reformulation de la spécificité des pôles

Pierre-Yves Gomez ()
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Pierre-Yves Gomez: EM - EMLyon Business School

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Abstract: In this paper, we address to some theoretical issues raised by the governance of clusters. We underline two main problems 1) It is difficult to specify property rights on collective outputs like those which are stemmed from clusters 2) The interests of the stakeholders involved in clusters do not systematically result in expectations for the same "profit". Consequently, we argue that clusters can be understood as collaborative organizations comparable with "open source organizations". Thus, their governance should take into account two characteristics of that kind of organizations 1) the production of positive externalities and 2) the management of X-efficiencies.

Date: 2009-01-01
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Published in Revue Française de Gestion, 2009, 35 (190), 197-209 p. ⟨10.3166/rfg.190.197-209.⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02311788

DOI: 10.3166/rfg.190.197-209.

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