Governance, ownership structure and performance of IPO firms: The impact of different types of private equity investors and institutional environments

Mike Wright, Garry Bruton, Igor Filatotchev and Salim Chahine

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This paper examines performance effects of ownership concentration and two types of private equity investors (venture capitalists and business angels) in firms that have recently undergone an initial public offering (IPO) in the United Kingdom and France. We expand and contextualize nascent understanding of multiple agency theory by examining heterogeneity of private equity investors and by suggesting that multiple agency relationships are affected by different institutional contexts. We employ a unique, hand-collected dataset of 224 matched IPOs (112 in each country). Controlling for the endogeneity of private equity investors' retained share ownership, we find support for the agency theory argument that concentrated ownership improves IPOs' performance. The research also shows that the two types of private equity investors have a differential impact on performance, and the legal institutions in a given country moderate this impact.

Date: 2010-05-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (100)

Published in Strategic Management Journal, 2010, 31 (5), pp.491-509 P

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Governance, ownership structure, and performance of IPO firms: the impact of different types of private equity investors and institutional environments (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02312519

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().