Sender-receiver games with cooperation

Francoise Forges and Ulrich Horst
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Ulrich Horst: Institut für Mathematik [Berlin] - TUB - Technical University of Berlin / Technische Universität Berlin, HU Berlin - Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin = Humboldt University of Berlin = Université Humboldt de Berlin

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Abstract: We consider generalized sender–receiver games in which the sender also has an action to choose, but this action is payoff-relevant only to himself. We study "cooperate and talk" equilibria (CTE) in which, before sending his message, the sender can commit to delegate his decision to the receiver. CTE are beneficial to the receiver (with respect to no communication) and unlike the equilibria of the plain cheap talk game, preserve him from afterwards regret. While existence of CTE cannot be guaranteed in general, a sufficient condition is that the receiver has a "uniform punishment decision" against the sender.

Keywords: Cheap talk; Commitment; Incentive compatibility; Information transmission; Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02313962v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2018, 76, ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.03.002⟩

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Journal Article: Sender–receiver games with cooperation (2018)
Working Paper: Sender-Receiver Games with Cooperation (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02313962

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.03.002

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